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Summary
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a new influenza-like disease; the
overall case fatality rate is currently estimated to be about 15%.  Scientists have
isolated a previously unknown type of coronavirus which they believe is the cause
of the disease.  The genetic material of the SARS virus has been sequenced and this
may be helpful in determining the origin of the virus and understanding its behavior
as well as developing a treatment and a vaccine.  Currently, all tests for SARS
infection are considered experimental. The World Health Organization (WHO) and
others are working to develop a reliable diagnostic test which can be used to confirm
a clinical diagnosis of SARS.
Federal, state and local public health agencies share responsibility for a range
of different activities that are important in effectively reacting to and ultimately
overcoming a disease outbreak such as SARS.  In investigating the SARS outbreak,
the most important activities are case detection, patient isolation and contact tracing
using disease surveillance systems as well as epidemiology and laboratory services.
Other important public health measures include the development and coordination
of emergency medical response plans, the regulation of environmental conditions that
impact health, and the rapid and clear communication of information between all
levels of the public health agencies, healthcare personnel, the media and the public.
The states have primary responsibility for protecting the health and welfare of
their citizens.  The federal government, through the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS), is responsible for preventing the introduction and spread of
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States at international
ports or from one state into another. HHS is also responsible for overall health policy
making and public health protection.  Among the federal agencies within HHS, those
primarily involved in the U.S. response to the SARS outbreak are the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The U.S. public health system has received dramatic funding increases over the
past 2 years to strengthen the public health infrastructure and enhance its capacity to
respond to emergencies such as a bioterrorist attack or outbreak of infectious disease.
Consequently, many analysts will be evaluating the U.S. reaction to the SARS
epidemic to identify any gaps in the public health system response and address them
accordingly, in order to be better prepared for any future event involving bioterrorism
or emerging infectious disease.
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1 WHO is the United Nations specialized agency for health worldwide.  WHO estimates that
the case fatality rate is less than 1% for persons age 24 or younger, 6% in persons 25 to 44
years, and 15% in persons 45 to 64 years. WHO Update 49, May 7, 2003.
[http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en/]
2 Current WHO SARS statistics can be found at: [http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en/].
3 Current CDC SARS statistics can be found at [http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/sars.htm].
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS): Public Health Situation and U.S.
Response
Medical Background
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a new infectious disease that
causes flu-like symptoms which may progress to pneumonia.  The incubation period
is 2-7 days but may be up to 10 days.  Symptoms include fever, malaise, chills,
headache, body ache, coughing, difficulty breathing, and diarrhea.  The disease
course and recovery period may take as long as 3 weeks.  In 10% of SARS cases the
symptoms are severe and patients need mechanical assistance to breathe.  The more
severe form of SARS tends to occur in people over 40 years of age.  The World
Health Organization (WHO) estimates the overall case fatality rate is about 15% and
over 50% in persons 65 years or older.1  Mortality is higher in people with underlying
chronic disease (hepatitis B, diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, stroke) or in those
who sought treatment at a late stage of SARS.
SARS was first recognized in Vietnam in late February 2003 by a WHO
epidemiologist and on March 12, 2003, WHO issued a global alert on SARS.  The
new disease was later linked to an outbreak of respiratory disease that began in mid-
November 2002 in Guangdong Province, China.  As of May 22, 2003, a total of
8,046 SARS cases and 682 deaths have been reported to WHO from 28 countries on
5 continents.2  China, Hong Kong and Taiwan account for 93% of all reported cases
and 91% of reported deaths.  In these areas, public health experts are concerned that
the disease has been spreading within the local community (rather than just within
hospitals or households), indicating the probability of continued SARS cases.  In the
United States as of May 21, 2003,  the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) has received reports from 40 states of 355 cases and no SARS-related deaths;
of the total, 290 are suspect cases and 65 are probable cases.3 
In late March 2003 an international team of scientists announced the isolation
of a previously unknown type of coronavirus which they believe is the cause of the
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4 Coronaviruses were first isolated from chickens in 1937.  The name derives from its
crown-like appearance when viewed with the electron microscope.  This family of viruses
are known to infect cattle, pigs, rodents, cats, dogs, and birds.  Coronaviruses are a serious
disease problem for agriculture, especially chickens.
5 DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid differs from RNA, ribonucleic acid, in the type of sugar
group contained in the molecule.  While the hereditary material of all living things and many
viruses is composed of DNA, some viruses have RNA as the hereditary material.
disease.4  Experiments in monkeys conducted by Dutch and U.S. scientists seem to
confirm that a coronavirus is the cause of SARS.  However, scientists in Canada and
China believe co-infection with another agent (chlamydia or metapneumovirus) may
also be involved.  Scientists believe co-infection, or some other factor like genetics
or hygiene, may explain why certain  patients, called “superspreaders,” seem to be
particularly infectious to those around them.  Coronaviruses are known to cause
serious respiratory and enteric disease in farm animals and pets; slight genetic
changes in the coronavirus greatly alter its lethality and the disease symptoms in
animals.  In humans, coronaviruses are thought to cause about 30% of common
colds. 
Patients with SARS shed virus in droplets of respiratory secretions created while
coughing or sneezing as well as in their stool and urine.  Although most SARS cases
have occurred in people such as family members or healthcare workers who have had
direct close contact with an infected person, a cluster of over 300 cases occurred in
residents of a Hong Kong apartment complex where contaminated sewage is thought
to have spread the disease.  Like other human respiratory viruses, the SARS virus can
survive 48 hours at room temperature and for longer periods at colder temperatures.
Scientists in Hong Kong report that the SARS virus can survive for 72 hours on
environmental surfaces such as stainless steel and plastic.  The SARS virus may be
unique, however, in its ability to survive for up to 4 days in stool samples from
patients with diarrhea.  Although detergents are not effective at inactivating the
SARS virus, standard disinfectants, such as bleach and alcohol, are effective. 
 The genetic material of the SARS virus is composed of RNA rather than DNA.5
All RNA viruses are inherently subject to a high level of mutations.  Consequently,
the SARS virus may change rapidly and evade drug treatments or vaccines.  On April
12, 2003, researchers in Vancouver, Canada, released genome sequence data for one
SARS virus isolate.  This was followed a few days later by sequence data from CDC;
several other labs have also sequenced additional SARS virus isolates.  The labs are
currently analyzing variations among the genome sequence data.  This information
may be helpful in determining the origin of the virus as well as understanding its
behavior.  The genome data might also help researchers develop treatments, a vaccine
and diagnostic tests. 
Currently, all tests for SARS infection are considered experimental.  WHO and
others are working to develop a reliable diagnostic test which can be used to confirm
a clinical diagnosis of SARS.  Because identifying a case of SARS is a diagnosis of
exclusion, until a reliable SARS laboratory test is available the accuracy of reported
SARS case numbers will rely on other laboratory tests to rule out alternative disease
agents combined with a clinical diagnosis of SARS.  Given the non-specific
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symptoms of SARS, a clinical diagnosis will not be as precise as a laboratory test and
will not include the expected much larger number of mild SARS cases.  All known
respiratory viruses cause a range of disease symptoms from mild to severe.  Scientists
have found some individuals who are infected with the SARS virus yet have only
minimal symptoms.  It is unknown if a patient with mild SARS can spread the
disease to others.  An accurate diagnostic test will identify such mild cases to help
prevent the spread of the disease as well as gain a more accurate statistical picture on
the extent of the SARS outbreak.  If the SARS case definition is expanded to include
mild disease cases, then the total number of SARS cases will increase thereby
lowering the case fatality rate, currently estimated at 15%. 
Scientists must learn more about the SARS disease process before they can
identify what test (antibody, viral culture, polymerase chain reaction — PCR) to use
on which specimen (throat or nasal swab, blood, stool, urine) for each stage of
disease.  An antibody test may not become positive for more than 3 weeks after
symptoms begin, and not all patients mount an antibody response.  A viral culture
may not be positive at an early stage of disease or in all patient tissues.  The PCR
test, which indicates snippets of viral genome are present, may remain positive long
after disease symptoms have resolved because defective (noninfectious) virus may
continue to be present in the patient.
The media have reported on a SARS treatment developed in Hong Kong that
some credit with helping patients overcome the disease.  The treatment consists of
ribavirin, an antiviral agent, and steroids, which act on the patient’s immune
response.  However, because laboratory tests of ribavirin against coronavirus found
the drug to be ineffective, some researchers speculate that these patients would get
better even without treatment.6  The issue is unlikely to be resolved until clinical
trials are performed comparing various treatment regimens.  Differences among
countries in SARS deaths and case fatality rates are most likely due to patient delay
in seeking medical care but may also be due to a more virulent virus or differences
in how SARS patients are treated.  Differences in the number of SARS cases among
countries, especially in health care personnel, may reflect gaps or delays in imposing
necessary infection control measures in hospitals.
Because SARS is a new disease and not completely understood, public health
officials are very concerned about spread of the SARS virus and the “atypical”
pneumonia and influenza-like symptoms associated with the disease.  However,
because in most countries SARS has not readily spread in the local community, many
experts conclude that the SARS virus is not as contagious as the influenza virus.  In
contrast, past influenza epidemics have spread rapidly and been much more deadly.
A 1968 flu outbreak spread worldwide within 8 weeks and caused 700,000 deaths.
The 1918 influenza epidemic is said to have killed 20 million people worldwide.
Scientists believe a similar deadly influenza epidemic is bound to reoccur in the
future.  In the United States,”typical” pneumonia and influenza kills 60,000 to 70,000
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7  In 1999 there were 63,730 deaths caused by pneumonia and influenza (P + I) in the United
States, averaging 1,226 deaths per week.  Of the 1999 total, 57,282 P + I deaths occurred in
persons over 65 years of age (weekly average 1,102 deaths) and therefore 6,448 deaths
occurred in persons under 65 years of age (weekly average 124 deaths).  In the 25-44 years
age group there were 1,402 deaths in 1999 due to P + I (weekly average of 27 deaths).
Health, United States, 2002, Table 32, p. 127 and Table 33, p. 132.
[www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus.htm]
8 For a more in depth discussion of the public health infrastructure in the United States, see
CRS Report RL31719, An Overview of the U.S. Public Health System in the Context of
Bioterrorism, by Holly Harvey.
9 For further information, see CRS Report RL31333, Federal and State Isolation and
Quarantine Authority, by Angie Welborn and the CDC website a:
[www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/quarantine.htm].
10 A current draft is available at [www.turningpointprogram.org].
people each year (1,200 each week) primarily the elderly.7  The number of deaths due
to influenza in the United States has tripled over the past 25 years; influenza now
kills three times as many people as AIDS.
U.S. Response
Federal, state and local public health agencies share responsibility for a range
of different activities that are important in effectively reacting to and ultimately
overcoming a disease outbreak.8  In investigating the SARS outbreak, the most
important activities are case detection, patient isolation and contact tracing using
disease surveillance systems as well as epidemiology and laboratory services.  Other
important public health measures include the development and coordination of
emergency medical response plans, the regulation of environmental conditions that
impact health, and the rapid and clear communication of information between all
levels of the public health agencies, healthcare personnel, the media and the public.
State and Local Public Health Agencies and Hospitals.  The states
have primary responsibility for protecting the health and welfare of their citizens.  In
general, all states have public health statutes that provide the authority for state and
local officials to perform various public health functions such as collecting data,
conducting inspections and enforcement activities, and licensing businesses, health
care delivery facilities, physicians and other providers.  The initial response to an
outbreak of a new disease such as SARS begins at the local level with state and local
public heath officials and healthcare personnel.  Examples of such responses include
active or passive disease surveillance systems, initial epidemiologic investigation,
health care delivery, isolation and quarantine management.  However, many states
have inadequate procedures in place for patient isolation and quarantining of persons
who are not yet ill but may have been exposed to an infectious agent and therefore
are potentially infectious.9  In general, state laws currently in effect address only
diseases that were the cause of past epidemics, not new diseases such as SARS.
Many states are reevaluating their isolation and quarantine laws and regulation.  The
Model State Emergency Powers Act has been under development since 2000 by
public health experts as a guide for states in developing new response plans.10
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[www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheetlegal.htm].  The text of the Executive Order is available
at [www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/pdf/executiveorder040403.pdf].
Department of Health and Human Services.  At the federal level, HHS
has primary responsibility for overall health policy making and public health
protection.  Among the federal agencies within HHS, those primarily involved in the
U.S. response to the SARS outbreak are the CDC, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  
On April 9, 2003, HHS Secretary Thompson met with vaccine manufacturers
GlaxoSmithKline, Wyeth, Merck, and Aventis Pasteur and asked that they test all
previously developed coronavirus vaccines as a possible SARS vaccine.  Because of
the high economic impact for agriculture, a number of animal vaccines have been
developed against coronaviruses.  In an address before the annual meeting of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Secretary
Thompson asked that the companies test all previously identified antiviral agents for
activity against the SARS virus.  On April 4, 2003, officials from CDC, FDA, NIH
and the HHS National Vaccine Program Office participated in a teleconference
hosted by the PhRMA with more than 70 representatives of the pharmaceutical
industry to discuss potential SARS diagnostics, drug treatments and vaccines.  
Although the states have the authority to safeguard the public health within each
state’s individual borders, the federal government, through the Secretary of HHS, has
primary responsibility for preventing the introduction and spread of communicable
diseases from foreign countries into the United States at international ports or from
one state into another.11  On April 4, 2003, President Bush signed Executive Order
13295 which added SARS to the list of diseases for which involuntary quarantine can
be used to prevent the transmission of a communicable disease.12  Other diseases on
the list include cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever and
viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa fever.  SARS is the first
disease to be added to the list in 20 years; the last disease added was Ebola in 1983.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  The FY2003 supplemental
appropriation (H.R.1559, P.L. 108-11) included $16 million for SARS prevention
and control activities at CDC.  The agency is working closely with WHO and other
partners in a global effort to address the SARS outbreak.  Under WHO coordination,
CDC scientists are in daily communication with scientists around the world, sharing
their research findings on a secure Internet site, and exchanging laboratory reagents
and specimens from SARS patients.  On March 14, 2003, CDC activated its
Emergency Operations Center to provide round-the-clock coordination and response.
CDC has committed more than 300 medical and support staff to work on the SARS
response.  CDC has deployed about 30 doctors, epidemiologists, and other specialists
to assist with onsite investigations around the world.  CDC experts have held
numerous media briefings to provide information on SARS research and surveillance
findings and prevention measures.  The CDC website is updated daily with
information for physicians on clinical guidelines and prevention measures as well as
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information for the public on SARS.  In contrast to the fall 2001 anthrax outbreak,
one federal government source, CDC, has been seen as providing timely, clear, and
consistent information on SARS to the media and the public.
CDC has provided ongoing assistance to state and local health departments in
investigating possible cases of SARS in the United States.  On March 15, 2003, the
agency issued an interim guidance for state and local health departments on enhanced
surveillance for SARS and infection control measures to prevent spread of the virus
to close contacts of SARS patients in hospitals and homes.  The agency has
conducted numerous teleconferences with state public health officials to provide
them with the latest information on the disease and discuss the implementation of
SARS surveillance and infection control measures.  The agency has also issued
interim guidance for the management of exposures to SARS and for cleaning of
airplanes that have transported a SARS patient.  CDC has issued a number of travel
advisories and alerts as well as guidelines for persons who must travel to SARS
affected areas.13  The agency has distributed health alert notice cards to airline
passengers entering the United States from SARS affected areas, alerting them to
monitor their health and contact a physician if they develop fever or respiratory
symptoms.
National Institutes of Health.  NIH is responding to the SARS outbreak in
the areas of diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccine development, drug screening and
clinical research primarily through the efforts of the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID).  NIAID has long been involved in conducting and
supporting research on emerging infectious diseases such as SARS through
intramural and extramural research and collaborations with international
organizations.  In Hong Kong, a NIAID supported influenza surveillance program has
collaborated with WHO and CDC in investigating the SARS outbreak and
developing a diagnostic test.  NIAID has funded the Respiratory Pathogens Research
Unit at Baylor College of Medicine which has developed methods to detect human
coronavirus and assess the immune response to coronavirus infection.
NIAID is supporting research on a SARS vaccine through the NIAID Vaccine
Research Center on the NIH campus as well as through other intramural and
extramural grants.  The initial approach will focus on an inactivated (killed) virus
vaccine, but NIAID also plans to support research on novel approaches such as
genetically engineered vaccines, DNA-based vaccines, and live-attenuated vaccines.
In response to a request from CDC, NIAID has sent 40 FDA-approved antiviral drugs
to the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for
evaluation of efficacy against the SARS virus.  NIAID is developing new antiviral
agents, and passive immunotherapy (monoclonal and polyclonal antibodies) will also
be investigated as a possible treatment for SARS.
Food and Drug Administration.  On April 17, 2003, the FDA issued a
guidance document on assessing blood donor suitability and blood product safety
CRS-7
1 4  T h e  F D A  g u i d a n c e  d o c u m e n t  c a n  b e  f o u n d  a t
[http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/sarsbldgd.htm].
with respect to the current outbreak of SARS.14  FDA is recommending additional
questioning of potential donors to determine if they may be at elevated risk for SARS
due to recent travel or due to exposure to a person with SARS.  Although current
FDA regulations require that all blood donors be in good health at the time of
donation, the new guidance will allow for the temporary deferral of blood donors
who may have been exposed to SARS.  FDA estimates that the new guidance will
have a minimal impact on the quantity of the blood supply; based on current travel
estimates, at most 0.4% of donors will be deferred.  The guidance document was
issued for immediate implementation in order to assure the safety of the blood supply
until more is learned about this new viral disease.  Although the guidance applies to
whole blood and blood components intended for transfusion and injectable and non-
injectable blood products, establishments using other human cells or tissues may
consider implementing similar donor screening practices.
FDA is also working with CDC and NIH in the battle against SARS to
accelerate the development of new diagnostic tools, safe and effective treatments, and
a safe and effective SARS vaccine.  The Center for Devices and Radiological Health
(CDHR) is working with CDC and private industry to bring a reliable SARS
diagnostic kit to market as quickly as possible.  The Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research (CDER) is helping identify drugs that are active against the SARS virus and
develop protocols to test these drugs in SARS patients.  The Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research is working with other government agencies and the private
sector to address early issues in the development of a SARS vaccine such as the use
of animal test data, safe manufacturing practices, and clinical trial design.
Issues for Congress
The U.S. public health system has received dramatic funding increases over the
past 2 years to strengthen the public health infrastructure and enhance its capacity to
respond to emergencies such as a bioterrorist attack or outbreak of infectious disease.
Consequently, many analysts will be evaluating the U.S. reaction to the SARS
epidemic to identify any gaps in the public health system response and address them
accordingly in order to be better prepared for a future event involving bioterrorism
or emerging infectious disease.
In FY2002, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided a
total of $1.075 billion  for public health emergency preparedness to the 50 states,
three municipalities (New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles County) and the
territories.  Of the FY2002 total, CDC received $940 million for state and local
public health preparedness which was distributed across the following six focus
areas:  preparedness planning and readiness assessment (~30% of grant funds);
surveillance and epidemiology (20%); laboratory capacity — biological agents
(15%); Health Alert Network/communications and information technology (15%);
risk communication and health information dissemination (5%); and education
training (10%).  The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) received
$135 million of the FY2002 total for hospital preparedness and infrastructure.  The
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funding is for the development and implementation of regional plans to improve the
capacity of hospitals, their emergency departments, outpatient centers, emergency
medical services (EMS) systems, and other collaborating entities for responding to
incidents requiring mass immunization, treatment, isolation and quarantine in the
aftermath of bioterrorism or an outbreak of infectious disease.
In FY2003, CDC received $938.9 million and HRSA received $514.6 million,
for a total of $1.45 billion to further enhance state and local preparedness.  HRSA
will also provide $28 million to academic health centers for a new initiative on
preparedness to enhance curricula in health professions schools and provide
continuing education/ training for practicing health care providers.  Guidance
documents for states and other eligible entities from CDC and HRSA on preparing
applications for FY2003 funds were issued on May 2, 2003 and are available on the
agencies’ websites.15
On May 7, 2003, before the House Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified a number of gaps in public health
preparedness that could interfere in the nation’s response to a disease threat such as
SARS.16  In site visits to seven cities and their respective state governments, GAO
found that the level of preparedness varied and planning for regional coordination
was lacking.  The state and local officials identified communication problems,
inadequacies in their surveillance systems and laboratory facilities, and workforce
shortages due to state budget cuts and a shortage of people with the necessary skills.
Most hospitals lacked the capacity to treat a large influx of infectious disease patients
due to already overcrowded emergency departments, lack of adequate medical
equipment, personal protective supplies, isolation facilities, and staff.  While four out
of five hospitals surveyed by GAO reported having developed an emergency response
plan for large-scale infectious disease outbreaks, few have participated in drills or
exercises.
In testimony on May 21, 2003, before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Dr. Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease
Research at the University of Minnesota stated that he believed that there will be a
resurgence of SARS early next winter “that could far exceed our experience to date.”
Dr. Osterholm stated that given the transmission of the SARS virus in China and
Taiwan, the respiratory disease “has now seeded itself in a significant number of
humans as to make its elimination impossible.  ...As a student of the natural history
of infectious diseases, I am convinced that like the early days of the HIV epidemic,
the worst of SARS is yet to come.”  When asked at the hearing for their opinion on
the future impact of SARS, both Dr. Julie Gerberding, Director of CDC, and Dr.
Anthony Fauci, Director of NIAID, agreed with the assessment made by Dr.
Osterholm.  Dr. Osterholm stated that the public health system remains underfunded
in the U.S.; not only is more money required, but also additional qualified personnel
“who will serve on the front lines of our ever increasing battles.”
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Also testifying at the May 21, 2003, Senate hearing was Dr. Mary Selecky,
Secretary of the Washington State Department of Health and President of the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials.  Dr. Selecky spoke of the strains
currently experienced in her state by public health workers who are responding to
emergencies, such as the smallpox vaccination program, SARS, West Nile virus, the
outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada, as well as
working on routine communicable diseases and preventative health issues.  Dr.
Selecky described the challenges in coordinating between the various levels of
government in how her office, CDC, and local health officials investigated whether
the respiratory symptoms experienced by crew members of a container ship in the
Tacoma, Washington port were consistent with the SARS case definition.  “While
CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine was helpful, their resource
limitations made it difficult to respond to all of the questions and calls for assistance
pouring in from across the country.”  Dr. Selecky agreed with Dr. Osterholm that
state and local health departments are facing a serious shortage of trained public
health professionals.  She stated that according to the National Association of State
Personnel Executives, states are facing up to a 40% loss in employees due to
retirement over the next 5 years, and the health workforce is the area in which the
resulting shortages will be the most severe. 
In conclusion, although most experts agree that recent increases in funding for
public health has been critical, they believe that continued investment is necessary
in order to redress the decades of neglect in the nation’s public health infrastructure.
Given the serious budget deficit problems experienced at the state and local levels,
it is likely that state and local governments will look to the federal government for
continued support in the effort to enhance public health preparedness.
